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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, there has been a movement toward achieving
democratic reform in the work-place. In an effort to improve
employment relations' and to stimulate increased worker
productivity,2 companies have been encouraged to provide employees
with a stronger voice in management through the use of ownership
plans. This movement, however, faces obstacles. Specifically,
there is an inherent tension between providing employees with a
degree of ownership to the extent that its effects will be
financially beneficial, and management's desire to maintain
control. Of the various forms of existing employee ownership, the
employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP") is the most common.3  In
1974, roughly 300 companies had ESOPs. 4  As of June 1990, the
figure waos closer to i0,000. In approximately 1,000 of those
companies featuring ESOPs, the employees owned a majority of the
stock.6
1. Cf. Dugger, Democratic Economic Planning and worker Ownership, 21 J. EcoN.
IssuEs 87, 90 (1987).
2. See Id. at 91.
3. COREY Rosm ET AL, EmpLOYE! OwnRsaip IN AMERIcA: THE EoUiy SOLUhION 17 (1986).
4. Id. at 15.
5. Henrey Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOP's, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YAE L.J. 1749, 1752 (1990).
6. Id.
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Nevertheless, the use of the ESOP in modern business remains
controversial. Some argue that it is not a form of real ownership,
and contend that it benefits the corporation to a greater extent
than it does the employee.7  Congress's attempt to encourage
employee ownership through the creation of ESOPs - with the
expectation that employees would have a greater overall investment
in their companies, thereby resulting in increased productivity,
has been criticized. The critics argue that the program has
somewhat backfired by lining "the pockets of management, banks and
investment bankers."8 Others maintain that employees have little
or no control making an ESOP company merely "an investor-owned firm
with incentive compensation schemes."9  Despite these criticisms,
ESOPs have grown tremendously since their formal inception in the
1970's. Today, approximately ten million employees, (roughly
twenty-five percent of all corporate workers) are covered by
ESOPs.10
This Comment explores the use and effects of the ESOP in
modern business practices. Section II discusses the historical
origins and characteristics of ESOPs. Section III addresses the
necessity of implementing and executing a fair and just ownership
plan, and the various steps courts have taken to ensure such a
result. This section also explores the existing tension between
the duty owed to the corporation and its shareholders and the duty
owed to ESOP shareholders. Section IV analyzes the issue of
employee control. Section V reviews the overall productivity of
ESOPs, focusing on specific business entities with successful
ownership plans. Finally, in Section VI, this Comment concludes
that by using ESOPs wisely, employee productivity will rise and the
business entity will flourish, while at the same time serving the
underlying policy of promoting workplace democracy.
II. A PERSPECTIVE
Although the concept surrounding the viability of employee
stock ownership is not recent,"' the ESOP became prominent only
7. See Susan Dentzer Et Al. The Foibles of ESOP's: Employee Stock Plans
Haven't Proved the Perfection of Capitalism, NEwswz , Oct. 19, 1987, at 59.
8. Id. at 58.
9. Hansmann, supra note 6, at 1757. The article states that "rarely are
[ESOPs] structured to give the workers a significant voice in the governance of
the firm." Id. at 1797.
10. Dentzer Et Al., supra note 7, at 50.
11. A brief historical recounting traces the concept of the ESOP to the
1950's and investment banker Louis Kelso. He maintained that a system where
workers could automatically become owners and would establish a stronger
foundation for the capitalist system. calling the system the ESOP, he sought to
convince companies that this plan would be ideal, since it would increase
productivity as well as provide effective tax breaks for the companies. While
his idea received some acceptance, many worried the courts would not allow the
tax benefits. Kelso decided to approach Senator Russell Long, who at that time
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after Congress's adoption of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.12 Also known as ERISA, it is an incentive
program designed to provide the employee with an opportunity to
acquire stock in its employer company without having the burden of
investing substantial amounts of money.1 Congress saw this as a
means of increasing employee wealth, productivity, and morale,
while simultaneously providing significant tax benefits to firms
implementing the program."4  The tax benefits were designed to
provide employer companies with an economic incentive to create
ESOPs. 15 Additional tax laws, such as the 1984 Deficit Reduction
Act and the 1986 Tax Reform Act, are also considered responsible
for the vast increase in the number of ESOPs."
A. Fundamental Characteristics of the ESOP
An ESOP is organized as a trust, with the purpose of either
providing shares of the company's own stock or contributing dollars
in order to purchase shares of stock from existing owners."'
Donovan v. Cunningham" provides a general description of the
mechanics of an ESOP as established by ERISA:
An ESOP is a form of employee benefit plan designed to
invest primarily in securities by its sponsoring company.
. . . An employer desiring to set up an ESOP will execute
a written document to define the terms of the plan and
the rights of beneficiaries under it. The plan document
must provide for one or more named fiduciaries to control
and manage the operation and administration of the plan.
A trust will be established to hold the assets of the
ESOP. The employer may then make tax-deductible
contributions to the plan in the form of its own stock or
cash. If cash is contributed, the ESOP then purchases
stock in the sponsoring company, either from the company
itself or from existing shareholders.19
was considered one of the most influential members of congress. Long not only
saw to it that the ESOPs were afforded the tax incentives suggested by Kelso, but
also provided a few more. COREY RosEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 14-15. Senator Long
was instrumental in the initiation of over twenty bills for the creation of
ESOPs. Ungeheuer, infra note 26, at 51.
12. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 1101-1461 (1988).
13. Alan Hyde & Craig Livingston, Employee Takeovers, 41 RuToZRs L. REv. 1131,
1139 (1989).
14. For a discussion of ESOP tax benefits, see supra note 13, at 1141-45.
15. Id. at 1140.
16. Julie Kaufman, Democratic ESOPs: Can workers Control Their Future?, 5
LA9. LAw. 825, 826 (1989).
17. ROsEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 17.
18. 716 F.2d 1455 (1983).
19. Id. at 1458-59 (citations omitted).
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B. The Leveraged ESOP
Alternatively, and in this respect ESOPs differ from other
benefit plans under ERISA, the ESOP trust may borrow money in order
to invest in the company stock.2" This is what is known as a
leveraged ESOP. 21 In a leveraged ESOP, the trust is financed by
an outside lender such as a commercial bank or a savings and
loan.22  Instead of giving the loan dollars to the corporation
itself, the lender directs the proceeds to the trust fund, which in
turn gives the lender a note for the loan amount." The
corporation becomes the guarantor of the loan, by promising to make
periodic payments into the trust to ensure that the debt is
properly amortized.24
The growth rate of leveraged ESOPs has been significant:
during the first half of 1989 ESOP borrowing was over $24
billion.25  Despite its recent success, the leveraged ESOP is not
without detractors. Even economist Louis Kelso, the individual
responsible for the ESOP concept, commented: "That is a perversion
of my idea . . . [i]nstead of making economic power more
democratic, they make it more plutocratic." '26
The emergence of the leveraged ESOP has spawned situations in
which device has proven instrumental in leveraged buyouts by
workers2 and as a tool for corporate management to avert hostile
takeover attempts.28  Contrary to popular belief, the
implementation of ESOPs by workers in failing companies is not the
norm. 29 In fact, ESOPs are utilized for worker buyouts of failing
20. Id. at 1459.
21. First Nat'l Bank of Blue Island v. Board. of Governors, 802 F.2d 291,
293 (7th cir. 1986).
22. Louis KELSO & PATICIA KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC POWER: EXTENDING TH ESOP RzvOLvTiON
60 (1986).
23. Id. at 61.
24. Id.
25. NATATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYE OWNERSIP, THE EMPLOY= OwEsRP READER 5 (1983)
[hereinafter READE]. The RAwDER, revised annually, is a publication of the National
Center for Employee ownership (NCEO), a non-profit research and membership
organization in Oakland, California. The READER is available from the NCEO for
a fee.
26. Frederick Ungeheuer, They Own the Place: Employee-Stock Plans Come of
Age as Morale Boosters and Takeover Tools, TIME, Feb. 6, 1989, at 51.
27. See Hyde & Livingston, supra note 13, at 1131-93.
28. For a discussion of this issue, see McLean, Employee stock ownership
Plans and Corporate Takeovers: Restraints on the Use of ESOPs by Corporate
Officers and Directors to Avert Hostile Takeovers, 10 PEPP. L. REv. 731 (1983).
29. Corey Rosen, The Growing Appeal of the Leveraged ESOP, J. Bus. STRATE,
Jan./Feb. 1989, at 17.
134
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
companies in approximately 1 percent of the cases.3" Additionally,
in only 1 percent of the cases are ESOPs established in which
employees must accept wage concessions for a minority interest in
the firm.3  It is estimated that about 98 percent of ESOPs are
created in healthy, productive companies.3
C. Employee Qualifications/Mechanics of ESOP Administration
The shares of stock in an ESOP are apportioned among the
employees through individual accounts.33 The number of shares in
each account is determined on the basis of an individual's salary,
seniority, or some other method of calculation.34 The employee's
right to acquire stock in her account will broaden as she achieves
increasing seniority, and this right will continue until she
becomes fully vested following a certain tenure.35  The employee
has the right to remove the stock from the trust account when she
either leaves the company or retires. 6 If the employee leaves the
company at any time prior to becoming fully vested, she may
withdraw the percentage of what she is entitled to receive in her
account. The remaining shares of stock that are not vested are
returned to the trust for reapportionment." Typically, the
employee sells the shares of acquired stock back to the
corporation.3  However, in the case of a public corporation, she
may freely sell the shares on the open market.
39
ESOPs are administered by a trustee, typically appointed by
management. The trustee can be from within the corporation,40 or
outside the realm of the corporation's management, i.e., a bank
trust department.4' Certain ESOPs provide broad voting power,
allowing employees to vote their stock on all matters (for
instance, in public companies), while others restrict the voting
30. Corey Rosen & Alan Cohen, Employees to the Rescue: The Record of Worker
Buyouts, 6 J.L. & Cons. 213, 214 (1986).
31. Id.
32. Rosen, supra note 29, at 17.
33. Id.
34. RosEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 17-18.




39. See READzR, supra note 25, at 37.
40. "ERISA clearly provides that a fiduciary may be an officer or employee
of the company whose securities he purchases on behalf of a plan. 29 U.S.c.
1108(c)(3)." Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1466 (5th Cir. 1983).
41. See RzAowR, supra note 25, at 7. Many experts in the field of ESOPs
recommend that it is preferable to appoint such independent trustees. Id.
135
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power to certain limited issues.42  Though there are instances
where employee participation in ESOPs is contingent upon wage
reductions,' most ESOPs do not require employee concessions.4"
ESOPs, being complex mechanisms, are heavily regulated to
ensure that the plans are utilized for legitimate corporate
purposes and in the best interests of the beneficiaries of the
trust. Such valid corporate purposes include improving employee
morale and loyalty," raising capital for the business," and
supplementing employee compensation or retirement benefits. 7
ESOPs may be created with some degree of flexibility in order to
accommodate overall corporate objectives, as when a company adopts
several ESOPs, with each trust representing a specific employee
group.4
8
III. ESOPS AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
While the analysis has focuses on the types of ESOPs and the
underlying purposes for their adoption, the question still remains
regarding the role of the courts, as well as the measures they have
taken to guarantee that the trusts are fairly administered and
implemented in the primary interest of the employee. This section
explores the steps courts have taken to ensure that ESOPs are not
abused by management, but rather are adopted for their intended
purpose.
Many of the ESOP cases involve allegations that plan
administrators breached their fiduciary duties to plan participants
as promulgated by ERISA, which defines these duties as follows:
A fiduciary shall discharge his duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interests of
the participants and beneficiaries . . . with
the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character
42.RosEm, supra note 3, at 16-17.
43. See Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 688 F. supp. 1357, 1359
(D.Minn. 1988) (employees participated in an ESOP following an agreement to a 15%
wage reduction).
44. see READER, supra note 25, at 22.
45. Norlin Corp. V. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984).
46. Id. See also Childers, 688 F. Supp. at 1359 (ESOP was established in
order to improve the company's financial position).
47. see Norlin, 744 F.2d at 266.
48. see Childers, 688 F. supp. at 1359 (the company adopted four ESOPs,
three representing each union and one for salaried employees).
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49.with like aims ....
In essence, this section imposes on ESOP plan fiduciaries both the
duty of loyalty and the duty of care. 0 In order to encourage the
use of ESOPs, courts, which construe these duties very strictly,
acknowledge the need to balance these standards with the large
degree of legislation Congress has passed.s' In addition, plan
administrators have a duty to disclose certain information to the
employees.5 2 Plan participants are also afforded remedies for such
.breaches of fiduciary duty including "removal of the fiduciary,
rescission of unlawful transactions, and recovery of monetary loss
to the plan.""53
A. ESOPS and the Status of Employee Owners: To Whom Does the
Fiduciary Duty Extend?
Recent ESOP cases involve the use of ESOPs as a means to avert
hostile takeovers. In this context, the target companies create
the ESOP knowing that the adoption of the trusts would entail a
large amount of debt, 54 presumably making the company an
unattractive takeover target. At first glance it appears that in
designing an ESOP for a company, the fact that it was used to
thwart a takeover does not necessarily render the plan illegitimate
as long as it was established in the best interests of the
employees. However, it seems that the primary concern of the
courts in these instances is that the ESOP be implemented with the
express purpose of employee benefit, rather than as a means to
maintain control of the firm and further entrench management.
Fairness to the employee participants is not the sole reason
behind permitting the ESOP to stand, rendering this issue
49. 29 U.S.c. S 1104(a) (1988).
50. See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464 (5th cir. 1983). The
opinion states: "The legislative history of ERISA indicates that Congress
intended to incorporate . . . the 'core principles of fiduciary conduct, that
were developed in the common law of trusts, but with modifications appropriate
for employee benefit plans." Id.
51. "competing with Congress' expressed policy to foster the formation of
ESOPs is the policy expressed in equally forceful terms in ERISA: that of
safeguarding the interests of participants in employee benefit plans by
vigorously enforcing standards of fiduciary responsibility." Id. at 1466.
52. such information includes "a summary plan description; an annual
statement of the plan's assets, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements; and,
upon request, a statement of a participant's or beneficiary's total accrued
benefits and total accrued nonforfeitable pension benefits." 29 U.S.C. Ss 1021-
1025. Childers, 688 F. Supp. at 1361.
53. See McLean, supra note 28, at 764.
54. "A leveraged buy-out is . . . a business practice wherein a company is
sold . . . under financial arrangements in which there is a minimum amount of
equity and a maximum amount of debt." United states v. Tabor Ct. Realty Corp.,
803 F.2d 1288, 1292 (3d Cir. 1986).
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particularly sensitive. In many of these cases, the administrators
of the ESOP are the directors of the corporation. Hence, there
exists a great tension between the fiduciary duty of trustees to
plan participants on the one hand, and the fiduciary duty towards
the corporation and its shareholders on the other. The following
cases are analyzed because they represent similar analyses of ESOPs
in the context of a corporate takeover; with the difference being
that the court upheld an ESOP creation in one instance, yet
disallowed it in another. Analysis indicates that the courts will
allow the ESOPs if they find that adoption does not contravene 'the
duties owed to the corporation and its shareholders.
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc.55  illustrates the
ineffectiveness of establishing an ESOP in the face of a hostile
takeover. Norlin, the target of a hostile takeover attempt,
established an ESOP. Norlin organized the trust to ensure its
voting control of the newly issued stock, presumably in order to
defend itself from moves made against the company.5 6  One of its
directors wrote to the shareholders indicating that the corporation
had established the ESOP, but provided no reason for the action
other than the avoidance of hostile takeover attempts.57  The
raider brought suit against Norlin asserting that the transfers of
stock violated federal securities laws, and that there was no valid
business purpose for the stock transfers in that the transfers were
performed for the express purpose of entrenching management.58
In its analysis, the court decided to adopt the fiduciary
principles standard to determine the viability of the ESOP.59 In
determining that the ESOP was not a proper exercise of authority by
the board of directors, the court first explored the "business
judgment rule"'6 which is used to determine compliance with the
duty of care.6" The court indicated that the business judgment
rule governs "only where the directors are not shown to have a
self-interest in the transaction at issue, '2 in which case it
"bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in
good faith and in exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and
legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes."63 By applying these
55. 744 F.2d 255 (2d cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 258.
57. Id. at 259.
58. Id. at 260.
59. Id. at 264.
60. Id.
61. The court defined the duty of care as the "responsibility of a corporate
fiduciary to exercise, in the performance of his tasks, the care that a
reasonably prudent person in a similar position would use under similar
circumstances." Id. at 264.
62. Id. at 265.
63. Id. at 264 (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629 (1979)).
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principles, the court found that the target company's transfer of
stock to the ESOP,64 solely to avert a takeover, violated Norlin's
fiduciary duty owed to its shareholders.6" This was held despite
the target company's contention that the creation of an ESOP was an
appropriate anti-takeover measure."'
The court applied a number of factors in reaching its
conclusion. The first factor considered was timing."' The court
noted that the timing of the issuance of the stock, in addition to
the fact that the ESOP was created at the same time of the
issuance, gave the impression that the plan was not created for the
purpose of providing benefit to employees, "but rather to solidify
management's control of the company."" The second factor
considered was the financial impact on the company. On this point,
the majority observed that the target company received no real
monetary consideration for the shares." The third factor
considered was the identity of the trustees. The court found that
all were members of the target company's board of directors. Hence,
they provided an additional management entrenchment inference."
The final factor considered was the voting of the ESOP shares. The
trustees/directors retained voting control of all the ESOP
shares,7 thus providing them with overall control in the decision-
making process.
After finding that Norlin violated these four essential
elements, the court held that the sole purpose of the establishment
of the ESOP was for the continued solidification of current
management. 2 The result was a breach of the fiduciary duty owed
to the company and its shareholders. To demonstrate that the
directors showed self-interest with the adoption of the ESOP, the
court shifted its focus from the duty of care to the duty of
loyalty which "derives from the prohibition against self-dealing
64. The company also transferred stock to a subsidiary located in Panama.
Id. at 259.
65. Id. at 267.
66. The defendant cited the case of Southeastern Pub. serv. Co. v.
Graniteville Co., C.A. No. 83-1028-8 May 19, 1983 as the precedent (the creation
of an ESOP is an appropriate step to thwart an attempt to acquire control of a
corporation.). Id at 267, n.13. However, the court stated that such would be a
viable precedent only in the absence of a showing of self-interest by the board.
Id. at 267, n.13.
67. Id. at 265-66.
68. Id. at 265. The court noted that when "an ESOP is set up in the context
of a contest for control . . . . It devolves upon the board to show that the plan
was in fact created to benefit the employees, and not simply to further the aim
of managerial entrenchment." Id. at 266.
69. Id. at 266, n.11.
70. Id. at 266-67.




that inheres in the fiduciary relationship.,"' Once a prima facie
showing of self-dealing was established, the burden shifted to the
directors to prove that the ESOP was fair to the corporation.7
4
As the preceding analysis indicates, the directors failed to meet
that burden."
An interesting aspect of this case is that although the plan
was described as an ESOP, it was not called an employee stock
ownership plan; but rather an employee stock option plan and trust,
which is different in form. 6 Nevertheless, the legal reasoning
used by the Norlin court proved instrumental to the analysis of the
ESOP created in light of a hostile takeover attempt. In addition,
the language in the opinion tends to indicate that the plan may
have, in fact, been an ESOP.
Although Norlin sheds some light on the use of ESOPs in
corporate practice, a number of questions remain. While the
primary importance rests on the duty of directors to the
corporation and its shareholders, many of the elements the court
considered reflect protective measures with respect to the employee
shareholder participants - namely, that the ESOP be fairly
administered. Does this mean that the ESOP participants,
technically shareholders of the corporation, are placed on the same
level of priority as all other shareholders? Or does the duty to
the corporation and its shareholders supersede the obligation to
ESOP participants so that an ESOP may be permitted even though the
plan might place heavy burdens on employee shareholders yet benefit
others? The ensuing discussion should provide further insight.
In Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp. the court
upheld the establishment of an ESOP which thwarted a hostile
takeover." In Shamrock, the raider and several current
shareholders of Polaroid, the target company, brought suit against
Polaroid. 8  The raider attacked the validity of an ESOP created
by Polaroid at the time the raider initiated a tender offer"9 for
all of Polaroid's outstanding common stock.80  The plaintiffs
73. Id. at 264.
74. See Id.
75. Id. at 265.
76. Id. at 259 (stock options allow an individual the opportunity to
purchase shares of company stock at a fixed price for a certain time, even though
the price of stock increases during that period).
77. 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
78. Id. at 259.
79. Id. (noting that a number of considerations reflected on Polaroid,s
vulnerability as a takeover target, including (1) a decrease in profits, (2) a
small amount of debt, and (3) a large amount of unliquidated assets). Id. at 261.
80. Id. 259.
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alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the target company's board,"'
all of whom were named defendants.82 They maintained that the ESOP
was used solely as a defensive measure to avert Shamrock's takeover
attempt.8 3
The court began its consideration of the issue by asserting
that "directors are responsible for managing the business affairs
of a . . . corporation and, in exercising that responsibility, they
are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation
and its shareholders.,8 4 The court stated that where the directors
are disinterested, decisions will be protected by the business
judgment rule, "a presumption that in making a business decision,
the directors . . . acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company."'5 The' court stressed that before the
business judgment rule should apply, the directors must show "
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness existed, and the defensive measure chosen by the
board must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'  In
order to determine if the ESOP was reasonable in light of the
attempted takeover, the court considered a number of factors,
including the effect the ESOP would have in terms of employee
productivity.87  The court stated that ESOPs have the benefit of
promoting increased employee morale and productivity."8  This,
combined with the type of relationship Polaroid had with its
employees8" would result in an effective ESOP that was beneficial
to the corporation. The voting of the shares was another important
element the court considered." The ESOP was designed for mirrored
81. Id.
82. Id. at 260.
83. Id. at 269.
84. Id. (citing Smith v. Van Gorkem, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. Super. Ct.
1985)).
85. Id. at 269 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The
opinion relied extensively on the case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), which, interestingly enough, did not deal with the adoption
of an ESOP, but rather established that directors are accorded protection under
the business judgment rule in response to corporate takeovers. The Unocal case
also established that issues to be determined in looking at a takeover bid and
its effects on the corporation include "inadequacy of the price offered, nature
and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies,
other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even
the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of
securities being offered in exchange." Id. at 955.
86. Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 269-70 (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
87. Id. at 272.
88. Id.
89. The court noted there was a "close identification" between the company
and its employees. Id.
90. Id. at 273.
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voting and tendering so that in the event of a tender offer, the
ESOP shareholders could direct the trustee to tender the shares in
their individual accounts. This set-up indicated that the board
did not intend to maintain control of the voting of the shares.91
The timing was another important element. Polaroid had considered
adopting an ESOP as an employee performance incentive program for
some time. The fact that the ESOP ultimately proved to be a
defensive measure did not, under the court's reasoning, detract
from the notion that the plan was established with the employees in
mind. 3
While these elements, similar to those found in Norlin,
indicate an awareness that some degree of obligation exists to
ensure that ESOPs are administered for the benefit of employee
participants, a number of other considerations came into view which
indicated that, overall, the primary obligation extends to the
corporation and its shareholders. The Polaroid court first
considered how the ESOP was to be funded, and to what degree it
would be funded by the corporation.9 4 In this regard, the-ESOP was
fundamentally fair because this burden rested on the employee
participants, not on the corporation or its stockholders.95 Next,
the court considered whether the ESOP would dilute the shares.9'
The court answered by contending that, although the ESOP would
initially result in diluting the shares of the public stockholders,
such a dilution would be offset by the increased earnings the
corporation would experience as a result of the increase in
employee efficiency.9P Taking all of these considerations into
account, the court concluded that the ESOP was fundamentally fair
and that the creation of the ESOP was a proper exercise of business
judgment. "
What becomes apparent from this case is that the creation of
91. Id. at 273. The plaintiffs contended that not only would an ESOP
stockholder be less likely to tender shares than a public stockholder, the ESOP
stockholders would be more friendly to management. Id.
92. Id. at 261.
93. For a more detailed analysis of the Polaroid case and other cases
dealing with the establishment of ESOPs as a defensive measure in the face of
corporate takeovers, see generally Michael Nassau Et. Al. ESOP's After Polaroid
- opportunities and Pitfalls, 15 EmpLoXERz EL. L.J. 347 (1989/90).
94. Shamrock, 559 A.2d at 271-72.
95. The sources for such funding included pay cuts, reduction in pay
increases, and the elimination of profit sharing retirement bonuses. Id. at 271.
96. Id. at 274.
97. Id. The court noted that this anticipated increase in worker
productivity is one of the key elements in allowing ESOPs as a response to
takeover attempts. It continued that if "the ESOPs' only purpose were to help
thwart hostile takeovers, I doubt that it would be considered entirely fair where
it dilutes the public stockholders' earnings per share. However, the evidence
is uncontradicted that ESOPs promote productivity." Id.
98. Id. at 275.
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the ESOP was permitted because it was fair to both the public
shareholders and the corporation. The implication is that ESOP
stockholders are viewed differently from other kinds of
shareholders and, that in such conflict of interest situations, the
primary interests of the public shareholders will ultimately
prevail. The conclusion is that an ESOP shareholder is different
in form than the traditional shareholder and will be treated by an
entirely different standard.
Reinforcement of this view is found throughout the language of
the Shamrock opinion. The following passage is particularly
striking:
Plaintiffs did stress the fact that the employees . . . were
opposed to a pay cut. This fact suggests that the ESOP would
not have been implemented in its present form if the decision
were put to a vote of the Polaroid work force .
Although the ESOP may not be terribly popular, there is simply
no evidence that the employees will express their displeasure
by cutting back on productivity. They still have their jobs
which, one must presume, they wish to retain.9
In another section of the opinion, with specific reference to
the voting of the shares, the court immediately assumed the ESOP
stockholders would support existing management. It reasoned that
"if an employee were being asked to choose between a better return
on his ESOP investment and the possibility that he will lose his
job, it is reasonable to anticipate that the employee would forego
the investment opportunity in favor of job security." '
Childers v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 0 1 though not dealing
with a hostile takeover issue, nonetheless lends support to the
proposition that ESOP shareholders are not viewed along the same
continuum as other conventional shareholders. In Childers, ESOP
participants brought suit against the company because their
acceptance of promotions resulted in an alteration of their union
affiliations, making them ineligible for additional stock
allocations.0 2  In addition, the promotions came after the
deadline for participation in the particular ESOP representing
their new employee group. Because of this, they were barred from
enjoying the benefits of those particular ESOP plans.103
In the first count of the complaint, the employees alleged
violations of ERISA provisions. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged
99. Id. at 272.
100. Id. at 273.
101. 688 F. Supp. 1357 (D.Minn. 1988).
102. Id. at 1359.
103. Id.
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that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty and argued that
the participation requirements were "arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable,"0 4 because they acted to deny employees an equal
opportunity to participate in the plan.' The court dismissed
both aspects of this count - holding that defendants, management
employees and union officers who served on the ESOP review boards,
were not acting as fiduciaries pursuant to ERISA.106 It contended
that "'settlor functions' relating to the formation, design and
termination of plans are not fiduciary activities."'
The court's decision on the second count of the complaint,
securities fraud, sets forth the notion that ESOP participants are
not perceived as conventional shareholders. The employees claimed
that defendants' failure to alter ESOP terms,"0 8 despite their
awareness that those terms prevented program participation upon
promotion, violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
19341'09 and Rule l0b-S of the Securities and Exchange
Commission."0  This was a very logical argument, given the fact
that ESOPs deal in company stock, and that participation in an ESOP
appears to be a type of securities transaction falling within the
purview of the 1934 Act and the Rule.
However, despite the apparent strength of this argument, the
court dismissed the count."' It held that in order for a cause
of action to fall under these provisions, there must be a "purchase
or sale,"112 and that the test is not satisfied under ESOPs.
First, there is no mention of coverage of ESOPs in the 1934
Act.' As to the assertion that the ESOP constituted an
investment contract, which does fall under the Act, the court
maintained that the proper test is one where "the scheme involves
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits coming
solely from the efforts of others."'1 4  The court reasoned that
while an ESOP may be considered a common venture, the plaintiffs
did not invest in it expecting to reap profits as a result of the
104. Id. at 1360.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1361. The court also dismissed the allegation that defendants
breached their fiduciary duty by failing to inform that promotions would exclude
plaintiffs from ESOP participation. It held the contention had no "basis in
law." Id. at 1361-62.
108. Id. at 1362.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1363.
112. Id. at 1362.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1363.
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management of the trust itself.115 In having the ESOP funded with
the company's stock, "any appreciation in the value of the stock
would not be attributable to the management of the ESOP, but to the
financial recovery of [the company] as a whole.""1 6
The court also concluded that an ESOP is a compulsory and
noncontributory plan, and as such, participants had not provided "a
specific consideration in return for a separable financial interest
with the characteristics of a security."" 7 Plaintiffs maintained
that they did furnish the requisite value because participation in
the plan was contingent upon a fifteen percent wage reduction.1 a
The court countered their contention by holding that the company
"demanded wage concessions in an attempt to preserve its cash
resources and working capital . . . the ESOPs were primarily a
method of deferring income, not a method of reducing wages to pay
for stock. ,.119
However, the significance of Childers lies not in whether
plaintiffs would have ultimately prevailed on the securities
violation issue, (the court dismissed that count of the complaint
on the ground that plaintiffs did not belong to the category of
shareholders who may properly assert a securities fraud claim under
the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5); rather, its significance lies in its
conclusion that ESOP shareholders are not like conventional
shareholders and, because of this, will be treated differently when
the circumstances call for it.
Despite the fact that ESOP shareholders may be viewed in a
different light, the ESOP concept itself should not be abolished
altogether. Even the takeover cases indicated that many of the
factors considered with respect to the creation of plans concern
the assurance that the trusts be fairly administered. This is true
even though the primary obligation of management extends to the
corporation and its shareholders. This seems quite sensible.
Aside from the protection afforded plan participants under ERISA,
it is logical to conceive that a company adopting an ESOP which is
not in the best interests of the employees will discover that the
corporation and all of its shareholders will be adversely affected
in the long run due to a decrease in employee motivation and
morale.
IV. THE CONTROL QUESTION
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that workers have no control over the company's management, despite
the fact that they are entitled to a share of the company's
earnings. Consequently, it is not actual ownership. Granted,
control of the company's management is not an ESOP requirement. In
fact, in many cases, the trustees, as directed by management, vote
the shares in the ESOP account.120  The problem lies in the
assertion that votes by the trustees do not reflect the attitudes
of the employees, but rather, th6se of management.
One rudimentary answer to this is that congress did not create
ESOPs with the purpose of worker control in mind, nor have ESOPs
been implemented primarily as a worker control device. 12' Also,
most leveraged buyout companies maintain a management structure
similar, if not identical, to the pre-buy out firm.12 1 Still,
others maintain the opinion that if employees receive wider control
via their voting rights, ESOPs would truly resemble a situation of
democratic worker ownership.2 3
Voting rights are available with ESOPs. The rights are
limited in private companies. They must be permitted to vote their
shares on major issues, such as closing or relocating.124
Although employees must be able to vote on all issues in public
companies, this is not a controlling interest. 25  However, a
growing number of companies allow full voting rights, because
research has indicated that "employees are conservative
shareholders who almost always vote for existing management. '12,
The result of these voting rights may have implications on
both sides of the spectrum. On one side, those arguing in favor of
granting employees broader control through their voting rights and
representation on the board of directors might say that changes in
corporate structure and policy would not change dramatically due to
this conservative worker attitude. Conversely, corporate
management can argue that because employee shareholders back
current management, simply having their shares voted by a qualified
trustee would suffice. Besides, they can further contend that
granting such control is by no means a guarantee that the firm will
ultimately succeed.'1
120. Rosen, supra note 29, at 18.
121. Hyde & Livingston, supra note 13, at 1139.
122. Rosen, supra note 29, at 19.
123. Dentzer, Friday & Cohn, supra note 7, at 59.
124. Rosen, supra note 29, at 17.
125. Id. at 19.
126. Id.
127. one such instance involved a company called South Bend Lathe, which was
purchased by its employees with an ESOP. The employees demanded, and received,
a controlling interest on the board of directors. Unfortunately, the firm went
bankrupt, despite its efforts. Rosen & Cohen, supra note 30, at 218-219.
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It is pertinent to note that while it is asserted that
employee control is not a priority with respect to the adoption of
an ESOP, Polaroid and Norlin demonstrate that voting rights are an
important factor in determining whether or not the ESOP was
properly administered.
V. ESOPS AND WORKER PARTICIPATION: A PRODUCTIVE COMBINATION
While Congress and the courts attempt to ensure that ESOPs
maintain the interests of the employee shareholders as a primary
objective,'28 the issue still remains whether they are as
effective as initial intentions, and in which instance are ESOPs
the proper vehicle towards improved employee motivation and
productivity. Obviously, an ESOP initiated solely for the purpose
of reaping tax benefits is arguably not in the best interests of
the employees and would probably defeat Congress's intended
purposes. Research indicates that ESOPs have their most dramatic
effect on employee morale, motivation, performance, and
productivity "if and only if the company combines ownership with a
high degree of employee participation at the job level."'2'
Studies also reveal that companies combining ESOPs with worker
participation programs grow three to four times faster than
companies that solely establish the only trust alone.13 In
addition, these firms grow at a yearly rate that is 8 percent to 11
percent faster than those firms owned and managed through
conventional means.
One great ESOP/worker participation success story is the Avis
Company. Employees at Avis purchased the company in 1987 for $1.75
billion. This purchase was intended to stabilize a firm which
constantly changed corporate owners. 2  The results were
positive, with company performance increasing to an extent so great
that even Avis customers signaled their satisfaction with the
employee ownership concept.133  This approval is the subject of
widely seen advertisements in which customers exclaim: "I know the
owner".134  Of significant importance is the degree of worker
participation sponsored by the company. Monthly meetings at the
local level, attended by management and employee representatives,
are held nationwide. Regional and national meetings, as well as a
communications program, prove to be conducive to effective employee
128. This may not necessarily always be the situation, as the corporate
takeover cases discussed above demonstrate.
129. Rosen, supra note 29, at 19.
130. see RZAzR, supra note 25, at 3.
131. Id. at 36.





Of similar fascination is the Polaroid case because, as
discussed earlier, the court approved the ESOP despite the court's
own cognizance that the company's employees would not have voted
for the trust.13 The court, however, noticed Polaroid's
impressive history of worker participation policies in weighing its
decision concerning the possible benefits of th& ESOP. 137 As the
court stated:
Another important aspect of Polaroid's culture . . . is
its emphasis on employee involvement in the success of
the company. In its early years, when Polaroid was a
small company, Dr. Land [Polaroid's founder] promoted a
"family" atmosphere by maintaining open and formal lines
of communication between workers and management and by
encouraging employees to share in management's goals for
growth and profitability. For example, Dr. Land held
annual meetings with the employees to discuss the
company's performance and future plans. He also created
an Employee's Committee (the "EC") shortly after World
War II to represent employees in connection with
grievances or other work related problems and to assist
in the preparation and evaluation of policies affecting
employees. As the company grew, other efforts were made
to maintain a high level of employee identification with
the company. 138
Apparently, these efforts have paid off. Following the first year
of the ESOP's implementation, Polaroid enjoyed profitability that
surpassed analyst expectation.13
Firms with such worker participation schemes will more closely
resemble true worker-owned organizations. These employees will
perceive that they possess a greater influence in business
operation decisions, evidently reaping numerous benefits. This
scheme ensures that corporate goals will be realized. With
increased communication at all levels, the employees, as
owners,1 40 have a real stake in the firm's success and as worker-
135. See generally NkATAIONAL CENTER FOR ExprEE OwNEasInp, TH ExnOYzz OWNERSHIP CASEBOOK
(1986), [hereinafter CAsEBox]. The CAsEooK, revised annually, is a publication of
the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), a non-profit research and
membership organization in oakland, California. The CAsEsBOx is available from the
NCEO for a fee.
136. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Poloroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 272 (Del. Ch.
1989), aff'd 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
137. Id. at 260.
138. Id.
139. CAsEBooK, supra note 135.
140. See Hansmann, supra note 5, at 1762.
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owners, will monitor each other's progress. In addition to this
obvious opportunity for increased financial strength, employees
will be more likely to remain with the company, refining and
specializing their skills, resulting in overall greater
productivity, efficiency, and harmony. Lastly, these worker
participation programs serve to open communication channels between
all levels, further reducing problems between workers and
management.
Additionally, increased participation will have certain
psychological benefits, in that employee-owners will have a greater
degree of satisfaction from collective decision making 1' and from
a sense of relative control. The diminished chances for conflict
between management and workers represents another advantage when
considering that worker ownership is at its best when conflicts of
interest are at a minimum.142  Finally, worker participation
programs induce a situation where the worker-owners believe that
they are' on the same "team" as management "promoting homogeneity of
interests among the worker-owners. ,"43
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the controversies, ESOPs remain a viable alternative
for firms desiring to distribute their wealth to employees. This
analysis has indicated that something beyond simply making
employees beneficiaries of a share of the profits may be necessary.
Ideally, employees could receive control of the firm by obtaining
a controlling interest through their voting rights. Realistically,
in most instances ESOPs will not yield such a result. However, the
analysis indicates that short of this actual control interest,
companies implementing ESOPs with worker participation programs
will enable ESOPs reach their maximum potential. Additionally,
without the tax advantages, many firms would not even consider
ESOPs. In fact, only about 7 percent of those firms with ESOPs in
effect have indicated that they would organize the trust absent tax
incentives. 14
While many detractors argue that the above tax reality represents
sufficient evidence to rule out ESOP's all together, this comment
contends that the tax advantages represent a necessary means to the
desired end that ESOPs are adopted.
Congress has adopted a great number of provisions to safeguard
that ESOPs are carried out for the benefit of the employee-owners,
141. Id. at 1769.
142. ;d. at 1784.
143. Id. at 1785.
144. ROSEN ET. AL., supra note 3, at 26.
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who are the beneficiaries of the trust. The courts are also doing
their part to ensure that ESOPs, when in dispute, are not abused by
companies as a management entrenchment device or a method of self-
dealing. In addition, those firms creating ESOPs solely for the
purpose of reaping attractive tax advantages and nothing more, may
soon find that such abuse will ultimately result in a hinderance of
overall corporate objectives rather than corporate benefits.
Companies that argue worker participation may be too time consuming
or costly have forsaken the true intent of the ESOP scheme.
Investment in these programs is fair in light of the substantial
tax benefits reaped. Those firms using ESOPs wisely (by taking the
time and effort to increase the lines of communication and to
encourage employee participation at all levels of the
organization), will reap the benefits of an effective ESOP plan.
At the same time, workers will feel more like owners in the sense
that they will have a greater stake in the success of the company
beyond the receipt of shares. In this way, ESOPs will serve as the
catalyst for an environment that resembles what many hope will be
a representation of effective, democratic worker ownership.
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